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Abstract
We show that individuals’ desire to protect their self-esteem against ego-threatening feed-
back can mitigate moral hazard in environments with purely subjective performance eval-
uations. In line with evidence from social psychology we assume that agents’ react ag-
gressively to evaluations by the principal which do not coincide with their own positive
self-perceptions and thereby generate costs of conﬂict for the principal. We identify con-
ditions for a positive welfare eﬀect of increasing costs of conﬂict or increasing sensitivity
to ego-threats, and a negative welfare eﬀect of a more informative information technology.
As a consequence, principals may choose imperfect information technologies in equilibrium
even if the signal quality is costless.
Keywords: Contracts, Subjective Evaluations, Self-Esteem, Ego-Threats.
JEL classiﬁcation: D01; D02; D82; D86; J41.
1 Introduction
Since the 1890s self-esteem is one of the most intensively studied concepts in social psychology
[see e.g. James (1890)]. It refers to people’s self-evaluation or, in other words, the belief
they hold about their self-worth. Everywhere people seem to care about it, try to enhance,
maintain and protect it [see e.g. Greenwald (1980)]. Anything that gives a boost in self-
esteem is almost universally welcome. People feel good when their self-perception is high and
rising, and people feel bad when it is low or dropping. Hardly anyone enjoys events that
constitute a blow or a loss to their self-esteem [Baumeister (2005)].
In recent years also economists have started to acknowledge the importance of self-esteem
in decision making and strategic interactions [e.g. Ko¨szegi (2006), Be´nabou & Tirole (2002),
Compte & Postlewaite (2004), Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008)]. It is argued that people
strive for positive self-perceptions because it entails a consumption, signaling and motivational
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value. Ko¨szegi (2006), for example, endows individuals with ‘ego-utility’ and demonstrates
the eﬀects on choice between more or less ambitious tasks. In particular, this model explains
the phenomenon of overconﬁdence by individuals who update believes according to Bayes’
rule. Be´nabou & Tirole (2002) and Compte & Postlewaite (2004), on the other hand, center
on the motivational value of self-conﬁdence. It is argued that conﬁdence in one’s ability and
eﬃcacy can help individuals to undertake more ambitious goals. When people have imperfect
knowledge about their own ability and/or when eﬀort and ability are complements, then more
self-conﬁdence enhances peoples’ motivation to act [Be´nabou & Tirole (2002): 873].
Psychologists, however, have not only identiﬁed the implicit impact of self-esteem on in-
formation processing and motivation, but also stress the individual’s eagerness to actively
maintain and protect positive self-perceptions [Greenwald (1980), Bushman & Baumeister
(1998), Baumeister (2005)]. First, people protect their self-esteem by systematically tak-
ing credit for success and denying blame for failure. Second, people have a tendency to
uncritically accept positive feedback and eagerly search for ﬂaws/faults in other’s criticism
[e.g. Baumeister (2005), Greenwald (1980)]. Third and most importantly for our investi-
gation, psychologists have found that conﬂicts and aggression tend to result from positive
self-images that are challenged or threatened [e.g. Baird (1977), Raskin et al (1991), Bush-
man & Baumeister (1998)]. It is argued that hostile aggression is an expression of the self’s
rejection of ego-threatening evaluations received from other people [e.g. Baumeister et al
(1996)]. People with high self-esteem usually hold conﬁdent and highly favorable ideas about
themselves, i.e. they exhibit ego-involvement, and react belligerently to ego-threatening feed-
back from others [Baird (1977), Shrauger & Lund (1975) and Korman (1969)]. Furthermore,
these behavioral reactions have been found to be the stronger the lower the perceived quality
of the feedback source [e.g. Albright and Levy (1995), Steelmann and Rutkowski (2004),
Roberson and Stewart (2006)]. The perceived accuracy of feedback information and the per-
ceived competence of the feedback source (i.e. the appraiser’s ‘knowledge’ of the employee’s
job and performance) are two important elements of evaluation processes determining fairness
perceptions of employees [see e.g. Landy et al (1978), Greenberg (1986), Evans & McShane
(1988), Fedor et al (1989), Shapiro et al (1994), Taylor et al (1995), Leung & Morris (2001),
Roberson & Stewart (2006)]. It has consistently been found that the higher the perceived
accuracy of feedback information and the higher the perceived competence/‘knowledge’ of the
feedback source, the higher the employees’ acceptance of negative feedback information and
the lower the level of conﬂict in the relation between feedback source and feedback recipient.
In this paper we formalize these ﬁndings and analyze the impact of aggressive reactions
to ego-threatening feedback on principal-agent relationships. More speciﬁcally, we show how
the individuals’ desire to protect their self-esteem can explain the existence of short-term or
one-shot contractual relationships in environments with unobservable eﬀort and subjective
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performance measures. We concentrate on situations in which neither eﬀort nor output can
be measured objectively as these constitute exactly the settings in which disagreements about
eﬀort and performance (and corresponding ego-threats) can arise.
In reality, it is very often impossible to objectively measure workers’ and especially man-
agers’ individual contributions to the success of projects. Therefore it is widely prevalent
to (also) take into account subjective evaluations in performance pay. Already in 1981 the
Bureau of National Aﬀairs reports, for example, that pay for performance systems involv-
ing subjective measures are more common than those involving only objective performance
signals. Furthermore, Milkovich and Wigdor (1991) and Levine (2003) cite more recent evi-
dence on the wide usage of subjective performance appraisal systems in performance pay in
e.g. investment banks, law ﬁrms and consultancies.
Our paper considers the following set-up. A principal wants to motivate an agent to spend
eﬀort on a complex good or service. Neither the agent’s eﬀort nor the outcome of the project
(the quality of the good or service) is publicly observable. However, the principal and the
agent receive private, i.e. subjective, signals about the eﬀort of the agent. These signals are
imperfectly correlated with each other and to the actual eﬀort level. To motivate the agent
to spend positive eﬀort, a contract has to specify payments which increase in the subjective
signal of the principal (an increase in the reported signal of the agent would just motivate
him to misrepresent his information). However, due to the imperfect signal technology the
principal can credibly report that he has received a signal of low eﬀort regardless of his actual
private information. As payments increase in the subjective signal of the principal, he is
always better oﬀ by misrepresenting positive information and paying the agent the minimum
wage. This will be anticipated by the agent and subgame - perfect equilibrium eﬀorts are
zero, i.e. no principal agent relationship can be established.
In a recent paper [MacLeod (2003)], it has been assumed that the principal can credibly
promise to make payments to a third party (contingent on the signal conﬁguration). In the
simplest case of two diﬀerent performance signals, the optimal contract ﬁxes a payment from
the principal to a third party if she pays the agent according to a bad signal and the agent
reports a good signal which satisﬁes the principal’s truthtelling constraint. The complete
ﬂexibility of third-party payments thereby ensures that a relationship (i.e. a positive eﬀort
level) can be established regardless of the parameters of the model (e.g. the correlation
between the principal’s and the agent’s signal, the size of the project etc.). Of course this
result crucially depends on the credibility of payments to the third party. In particular,
while the principal cannot credibly promise the agent to report his signal truthfully, it is
assumed that he can make such a promise to the third party. To explain the widespread use
of subjective information in particular in labor market relations, MacLeod (2003) refers to
the third party payments as anticipations of future conﬂict in an un-modelled dynamic game.
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In this paper, we explicitly model the conﬂict discussed in Macleod (2003) and show
that a principal-agent relationship can be established on the basis of subjective performance
evaluations, if the agent tries to defend his self-esteem through the creation of conﬂict or ag-
gressive actions. In line with the aforementioned psychological evidence, we assume that the
agent perceives a negative psychological payoﬀ from ego-threatening performance evaluations
by the principal. He suﬀers from bad performance evaluations by the principal, whenever
she does not share his opinion based on his own subjective signal. Furthermore, we assume
that he suﬀers the more the lower the accuracy of the information technology used by the
principal. The agent can reduce his negative psychological payoﬀ through conﬂict/trouble
imposed on the principal, e.g. the agent goes to court in order to enforce the bonus payment,
steals, or refuses to cooperate on other tasks.1 If the agent creates trouble, the principal will
face costs of conﬂict.2 The costs of conﬂict play the very same role as MacLeod (2003)’s
third-party payments - they enforce truth-telling by the principal. In our setting, however,
costs of conﬂict are not at the principal’s disposal but rather depend on the agent’s sensi-
tivity to ego-threats, the quality of the information technology etc.. Our analysis identiﬁes
conditions on conﬂict levels, project returns, the quality of information, and the sensitivity
to ego-threats which promote or rule-out the implementation of positive equilibrium eﬀort
levels. In particular, we identify conditions for a positive welfare eﬀect of increasing costs
of conﬂict or increasing sensitivity to ego-threats, and a negative welfare eﬀect of a more
informative information technology. As a consequence, it can be shown that principals may
choose imperfect information technologies in equilibrium even if the signal quality is costless.
Our model is related but conceptually diﬀerent from Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008)’s
model of self-esteem. They model a situation in which agents sense a psychological payoﬀ
from being esteemed by others (and thereby refer to the motivational value of self-esteem –
see above). Agents in their setting take pride in what others think about them, i.e.,, agents
would derive utility from their belief about the principal’s evaluation of their performance in
our setting. Wage payments contingent on the principal’s subjective evaluation would then
up-date the agents belief about the principal’s appraisal. But as the principal has an incentive
to misrepresent positive information as long as he does not expect any conﬂict (see above),
such a psychological payoﬀ structure would not establish positive equilibrium eﬀorts in our
setting.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present the principal-agent
relation and the psychological payoﬀ structure. As a benchmark, Section 3 analyzes the
situation of pure moral hazard and determines the optimal eﬀort choice and comparative
1Note, all that counts is that these conﬂicts are anticipated as costs by the principal.
2This mechanism could be interpreted as negative reciprocity. Unlike the existing models of reciprocity [e.g.,
Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk & Fischbacher (2006)], however, what is considered
psychologically costly in our model does not depend on beliefs about strategies and their associated outcomes,
but rather on (reported) signal constellations.
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statics of social welfare in the absence of binding truth-telling constraints. Section 4 continues
with an analysis of the impact of binding truth-telling constraints on optimal eﬀort choice and
social welfare. While Sections 3 and 4 consider an exogenously given information technology,
Section 5 will investigate the principal’s optimal choice of an information technology. Section 6
concludes with some remarks on the practical implications of our model and its robustness.
2 The model
In this section we introduce the principal-agent relationship and present a psychological payoﬀ
structure which captures the empirical evidence on self-esteem and ego-threats from social
psychology. Furthermore we characterize the ﬁrst best solution and present auxiliary results
on the agent’s decision on conﬂict creation and the optimality of simple bonus contracts.
Production Technology Assume there is a risk-neutral principal, P , who decides upon
undertaking a project which generates a value of φ > 0 if successful. The project requires
eﬀort of an agent, A. Assume that if the agent spends eﬀort p ∈ [0, 1], the project will be
successful (create value φ) with probability p. The project is a complex good or service and
its success is not veriﬁable, i.e. contracts contingent on the generation of φ are not feasible.
Information Technology Neither principal nor agent can observe whether the project is
successful or not. Rather, both form an opinion about the agent’s performance during the
production process. Formally, they receive private signals about the agent’s performance.
The principal receives sP ∈ SP , where SP = {L,H}, i.e. the principal’s opinion can be such
that he regards the agent’s performance as either high (H) or low (L). Analogously, the agent
receives sA ∈ SA with SA = {L,H}. The signals sP and sA are non-veriﬁable private pieces
of information of the principal and the agent, respectively.
The signals are informative with respect to the success of the project. If the project is
not successful (which happens with probability (1−p)), principal and agent receive the signal
sP = sA = L. If the project is successful, the principal receives the signal sP = H with
probability g, the agent receives the same signal with probability ρ and receives sA = H as
an independent signal with probability x. Hence, g measures the quality of the principal’s
signal, ρ indicates the correlation between the agent’s and the principal’s signal - or the
counter-probability of an independent judgment - and x quantiﬁes the quality of the agent’s
signal if he forms an independent judgment (i.e., we adopt the speciﬁcation of the information
technology in Mcleod (2003), p.228).
Assumption 1. Information Technology
We assume that the principal’s and the agent’s signal are imperfect, i.e., g ∈ (0, 1) and
x ∈ (0, 1), and positively but imperfectly correlated, i.e., ρ ∈ (0, 1).
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We denote by γkl the conditional probability that sP = k and sA = l given that the
project is a success. Then, the ex-ante probability for the signal pair sP = L and sA = H, for
instance, will be pγLH = p(1− g)(1− ρ)x.3 Note that by Assumption 1, γHHγLL > γHLγLH .
The Game The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The principal oﬀers a contract to the agent and the agent decides upon acceptance.4
Upfront payments are arranged.
2. The agent decides upon eﬀort p.
3. The project generates value φ with probability p.
4. The principal receives sP and the agent receives sA. The principal and the agent report
(not necessarily truth-fully) on sP and sA. Denote the reports by tP and tA, respectively.
tP and tA are veriﬁable.
5. The payments contingent on tP and tA are arranged.
6. Contingent on sA and received payments, the agent decides upon retaliation (with eﬀort
q).
Agent For an eﬀort of p the agent incurs costs v(p) with v ∈ C2, v(0) = 0, v′(0) = 0,
v′′(p) > 0 and limp→1 v (p) =∞.
First Best Eﬀort Level Had the principal access to the agent’s production technology,
his eﬀort choice would solve v′(p) = φ. For further reference, we will denote the ﬁrst best
eﬀort level by pFB and the respective surplus by ΠFB. Our assumptions on v(p) ensure that
pFB ∈ (0, 1).
Psychological Payoﬀs The agent is risk-neutral and senses a psychological payoﬀ that
depends on his opinion about his own performance, sA, and the reported opinion of the
principal, tP . More speciﬁcally, the agent’s utility function reads:
U = w − v(p)− Y (tP , sA, g)(1 − q)− c(q) (1)
Thereby, w denotes the wage payment, Y (tP , sA, g) represents the agent’s psychological payoﬀ
for a given conﬁguration of (reported) signals and a given quality of the principal’s signal, q
is the level of conﬂict (or retaliation) created by the agent and c(q) is the agent’s cost for the
level of conﬂict q with c ∈ C2, c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, c′′(q) > 0 and limq→1 c (q) =∞.
3All γkl as functions of g, ρ, and x can be found in Appendix 8.1.
4In section 5, the principal will in addition also choose the quality of his own signal (g).
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We continue with a speciﬁcation of Y (tP , sA, g) which tries to capture the empirical evi-
dence from social psychology on self-esteem, ego-threats, and retaliatory behavior.
Assumption 2. Psychological Costs
(i) Y (tP , sA = L, g) = 0 for all tP and g.
(ii) Y (tP = H, sA, g) = 0 for all sA and g.
(iii) Y (L,H, g) ∈ C1 and Y (L,H, g) > 0, dY (L,H,g)dg ≤ 0 for all g.
Part (i) captures that individuals with low self-esteem (represented by sA = L) do not
exhibit ego-involvement and show less reaction to feedback (be it conﬁrming or threatening)
[see e.g. Baumeister, Smart & Boden (1996)]. Parts (ii) and (iii) respectively formalize the
ﬁnding that individuals who hold a high opinion about themselves and are ‘ego-involved’
(sA = H) uncritically accept positive or conﬁrming feedback [see e.g. Baumeister (2005)] -
formalized by zero psychological costs - and suﬀer from negative or threatening assessments
[see e.g. Bushman and Baumeister (1998)] – represented by non-zero psychological cost in
our model. Furthermore, we assume that psychological costs (weakly) decrease in the quality
of the feedback source (i.e., the quality of the principal’s signal parameterized by g) which
captures the observation that individuals are the more willing to accept negative feedback the
higher the perceived accuracy of the feedback information [e.g. Albright and Levy (1995),
Steelmann and Rutkowski (2004), Roberson and Stewart (2006)].
In response to an ego-threat the agent can reduce his psychological costs that arise from the
deviant (reported) opinions about his performance by creating conﬂict/trouble (as observed
by [Baird (1977), Shrauger & Lund (1975) and Korman (1969)]). For further reference, we
summarize some results concerning the agent’s optimal conﬂict level.
Lemma 1. Conﬂict Creation
Suppose Y (tP , sA, g) satisﬁes Assumption 2.
(i) Then, the agent chooses q = argmax(Y (tP , sA, g)(1 − q)− c(q)).
(ii) Suppose sA = L and/or tP = H. Then, Y (tP , sA, g) = 0 and the agent chooses q = 0.
(ii) Suppose sA = H and tP = L. Then, the agent chooses q ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Follows from Eqn. 1 and Assumption 2.
According to Lemma 1, the agent retaliates (i.e., q > 0) if and only if sA = H and
tP = L. The agent retaliates if he has a high opinion of himself and his ego / self-perception
is threatened. For further reference we abbreviate Y (L,H, g) ≡ Y . 5 Moreover, q∗ > 0 will
5In section 5, g is endogenized and we will refer to Y (L,H, g) as Y (g).
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henceforth denote the conﬂict level for the conﬁguration tP = L and sA = H. As the agent
chooses q = 0 for all other conﬁgurations, no confusion should arise. Note that the higher
the psychological costs created by the diﬀerence in the principal’s and agent’s evaluation (Y ),
the higher the level of conﬂict q∗. In particular, the poorer the information technology of
the principal – the less he is regarded “competent” by the agent–, the more belligerently
the agent will react to ego-threats (i.e., dq
∗
dg ≤ 0).6 We assume throughout this paper that
Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed.
Principal In contrast to the agent, the principal only cares about his proﬁt
Π = pφ− E {w} − E {q}ψ, (2)
where pφ is the expected beneﬁt generated by the agent, E {w} are the expected wage cost
of employing the agent, and E {q}ψ are the expected costs of conﬂict due to retaliation. As
our assumptions on c(q) ensure that q ∈ [0, 1], we can interpret q as the probability with
which the agent creates costs of ψ > 0 for the principal. First best proﬁts are given by
ΠFB = pFBφ− v(pFB).
Contracts In our setting with unobservable eﬀort and subjective measures of performance,
a contract Γ can only be contingent on the reported subjective opinions of the principal
and the agent. Hence, a contract ﬁxes payments for all conﬁgurations of reports tP and
tA and reads Γ = {wkl | k ∈ SP , l ∈ SA}. The agent accepts a contract if he expects a
(weakly) positive utility from it (individual rationality) and chooses p as to maximize his
utility (incentive compatibility). If a contract Γ is individually rational and the agent chooses
eﬀort p, we say that Γ implements p. Principal and agent report their opinions, i.e. signals,
truthfully if and only if they weakly beneﬁt from doing so.
Cost Minimizing Contracts How do optimal contracts look like given that eﬀort is unob-
servable, performance measures are subjective and agents try to protect a positive self-image
through the creation of conﬂict? A standard application of the revelation principle implies
that we can restrict ourselves to simple bonus contracts without any loss of generality.
Lemma 2. Reduced Form Contracts
Suppose there exists a contract Γ which implements p > 0. Then, there always exists a contract
Γˆ which implements p at weakly lower costs and
(i) Principal and agent tell the truth.
(ii) wkl = wkm ≡ wk for all k ∈ SP and l,m ∈ SA.
6The inequality is strict if and only if dY (L,H,g)
dg
< 0.
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(iii) wH > wL.
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
For convenience, we deﬁne wH = f + b, wL = f and Γ = (b, f). By Lemma 2(iii), b > 0.7
The principal’s objective to oﬀer a proﬁt maximizing contract – i.e., an optimal combi-
nation of a ﬁxed payment and a bonus – is burdened with (i) moral hazard as the agent’s
eﬀort is unobservable and (ii) a truth-telling problem as the principal has to credibly commit
herself to a truthful revelation of his own signal.8 In the next sections we will ﬁrst analyze
the pure moral hazard problem (i.e., the case of non-binding truth-telling constraints) and
then proceed with an analysis of the truthtelling problem.
3 Pure Moral Hazard Problem
In this section we abstract from the truthtelling problem inherent to the principal-agent
relationship in order to analyze the isolated impact of moral hazard on the optimal eﬀort
level chosen by the principal and social welfare. Hence, we assume throughout this section
that the contract Γ = (f, b) guarantees truth-telling (i.e., truth-telling constraints are non-
binding).
Incentive Compatibility For a given contract Γ = (f, b), the agent chooses eﬀort p as to
maximize his utility (see Eqn. 1) while anticipating the generation of ex-post conﬂict at level
q∗ as depicted in Lemma 1. This means, he maximizes
U(p) = p(γHH + γHL)b + f − v(p)− pγLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))
which induces the ﬁrst order condition9
b(p) =
v′(p) + γLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))
γHH + γHL
=
1
g
(v′(p) + (1− g)(1 − ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))). (3)
Note that d
2U(p)
dp2
= v′′(p) > 0 such that the agent’s optimization problem is well-behaved.
Eqn. (3) shows that the incentive compatible bonus that the principal pays to the agent
in case he beliefs that the agent did a good job has to overcome marginal eﬀort costs and
marginal psychological costs. If the principal wants to induce a positive eﬀort level, he has
7f can be interpreted as an up-front payment or a franchise fee with a payment of zero at stage 5 if the
principal reports tP = L and a payment of b (a bonus) if she reports tP = H .
8According to Lemma 2(ii), the agent’s report does not aﬀect his payoﬀ such that we are save to assume a
truthful revelation of his signal.
9We denote a bonus which implements an eﬀort level of p by b(p).
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to oﬀer a positive bonus. Note, however, that the required bonus does not vanish in the
limit of small eﬀorts, because marginal psychological costs do not vanish for p = 0. Finally,
observe that the incentive compatible bonus increases in target eﬀort p, psychological costs
Y , and the conditional probability of conﬂict (γLH). In particular, a higher quality of the
principal’s signal g reduces the incentive compatible bonus because the agent expects higher
returns to eﬀort, the probability of conﬂict decreases, and the agent’s psychological costs in
case of conﬂict diminish. Likewise, a lower correlation of the signals or a higher probability
of a positive independent evaluation by the agent enhances the compensation requested by
the agent for a given eﬀort level.
Individual Rationality The agent accepts a contract Γ = (f, b) whenever his expected
utility from it is weakly positive, i.e.
p(γHH + γHL)b + f − v(p)− pγLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗)) ≥ 0.
To maximize her proﬁts, the principal sets the upfront payment for a given bonus b to
f(b) = −p(γHH + γHL)b + v(p) + pγLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗)).
Observe that the upfront-payment can well be negative (i.e., a franchise fee) as the agent is
not protected by limited liability. Note in particular that f(b) can always be ﬁxed such that
the agent does not receive any rents from the relationship.
What are the principal’s costs to implement an eﬀort level p > 0 on the basis of these
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints?
Eﬀort Costs To implement eﬀort p > 0 the principal’s costs are C(p) = f + p(γHH +
γHL)b(p) = v(p)+ pγLH((1− q∗)Y + c(q∗)). Note that C(p) is convex and that C(0) = 0. We
adopt the convention that an eﬀort p > 0 which is not implementable requires inﬁnite costs.
Optimal Eﬀort The principal’s proﬁt now reads
Π(p) = pφ− pγLHq∗ψ −C(p)
which is zero for p = 0 and concave for p > 0. We denote the maximum of Π(p) on [0, 1] by p˜
and the corresponding proﬁt for the principal by Π˜10 and derive the following set of results.
Proposition 1. Pure Moral Hazard
(i) p˜ > 0 if and only if φ > φ ≡ γLH(q∗Ψ + ((1 − q∗)Y + c(q∗))).
10p˜ and Π˜ are equilibrium eﬀort and proﬁt whenever the truth-telling constraints are non-binding.
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(ii) Suppose φ > φ. Then, dp˜dφ > 0,
dp˜
dψ < 0,
dp˜
dg > 0,
dp˜
dρ > 0, and
dp˜
dx < 0.
(iii) Suppose φ > φ. Then, dΠ˜dφ > 0,
dΠ˜
dψ < 0,
dΠ˜
dg > 0,
dΠ˜
dρ > 0, and
dΠ˜
dx < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.4
Part (i) indicates that a relationship with positive eﬀort level (i.e., p˜ > 0) can only be
established if the value of the project exceeds the expected costs of retaliation for the principal
and the expected compensation for the psychological costs of the agent. If a relationship is
established because the value of the project is above this threshold, the comparative statics of
the optimal eﬀort level p˜ are straightforward. As indicated in Part (ii), an increase in the value
of the project certainly enhances marginal beneﬁts and thereby p˜. Likewise, higher costs of
conﬂict for the principal enhance marginal costs and lower the optimal eﬀort level. A higher
quality of the principal’s signal reduces the probability of conﬂict and psychological costs for
the agent which reduces marginal costs and leads to higher optimal eﬀort levels. A higher
correlation of signals or a lower quality of an independent judgement have a similar eﬀect as
they also result in lower expected conﬂict levels and a lower compensation of psychological
costs.
As indicated in Part (iii), these intuitive eﬀects also carry over to the comparative statics
of the principal’s proﬁt. The higher the value of the project and the lower expected costs
associated with the retaliation of the agent, the more proﬁt is awarded to the principal. In
particular, the principal gains from a decrease in retaliation costs ψ, an increase in the princi-
pal’s signal quality g (which reduces the probability of conﬂict and the agent’s psychological
costs), an increase in the signal correlation ρ and a decrease in the probability that the agent
receives an independent signal x.
As the agent does not receive any rents in the optimal contract, the principal’s proﬁt also
measures the surplus of the relationship. Hence, in the case of non-binding truth-telling con-
straints, conﬂicts (i.e. their likelihood γLH and size q∗Ψ) as well as the agent’s psychological
sensitivity Y only have a welfare detrimental eﬀect. Therefore, any property of the informa-
tion technology which reduces conﬂict (i.e. an increase in g or ρ) is welfare-enhancing, while
an increase in the quality of the agent’s independent judgment x induces the adverse eﬀect.
In this section we have abstracted from the truthtelling problem, i.e. we have concentrated
on the case of non-binding truthtelling constraints, to isolate the impact of moral hazard. In
the following section, we analyze the robustness of these ﬁndings in the presence of truthtelling
constraints.
4 Truth-Telling Problem
With a contract as characterized in Lemma 2(ii), the agent is indiﬀerent between all possible
reports as his payment (and also his psychological payoﬀ) will be unaﬀected by his own
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reporting decision. Hence, we can savely adopt the convention that the agent always tells the
truth. This given, the principal’s proﬁt contingent on the agent’s and her own report can be
represented in the following table (with the principal’s report depicted in the rows and the
agent’s report (and signal) depicted in the columns).
H L
H pφ− f − b pφ− f − b
L pφ− f − q∗ψ pφ− f
Suppose sP = H. Then, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoﬀ from doing
so (which reads pφ − f − b) is larger than his payoﬀ from reporting tP = L (which reads
pφ− f − Pr(sA = H | sP = H)q∗ψ). This means the principal reports tP = H if
b ≤ γHH
(γHH + γHL)
q∗ψ = (ρ + (1− ρ)x)q∗ψ ≡ bmax. (4)
The principal can only credibly promise a bonus b below bmax. Note that this upper bound
to credible bonuses increases in the signal correlation ρ and in the quality of an independent
judgment x. An increase in each of these parameters lowers the probability of the conﬁguration
sP = H and sA = L in which case the principal could cheat without facing retaliation and
therefore reduces the incentive to save the bonus payment. Moreover, bmax certainly increases
in the level of conﬂict q∗ψ and thereby decreases in the quality of the principal’s signal g.
Intuitively, the agent anticipates that there is the less potential for conﬂict in the relation,
the more competent the principal is in evaluating his job and performance. The less potential
for conﬂict, however, the lower the maximum bonus the principal can oﬀer without having
an incentive to cheat ex-post.
If sP = L, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoﬀ from doing so (which reads
pφ− f − Pr(sA = H | sP = L)q∗ψ) is larger than his payoﬀ from reporting tP = H (which
reads pφ− f − b). Hence, the principal reports tP = L if
b ≥ γLH
(γLH + γLL)
q∗ψ =
(1− ρ)x
(1− ρx)q
∗ψ ≡ bmin. (5)
The principal can also not promise to pay arbitrarily low bonuses as he has an incentive to
evade conﬂict through ‘unconditional bonuses’. By paying the bonus independently of his
signal, the principal avoids any conﬂict with an agent who is prepared to protect his positive
self-image. The minimal credible bonus is thereby decreasing in the signal correlation ρ and
increasing in the quality of an independent judgment x because the larger ρ and the smaller
x the smaller is the probability of the conﬁguration sA = H and sP = L in which case the
principal would beneﬁt from conﬂict evasion. Similarly to bmax, an increase in g lowers the
retaliation probability q∗ and thereby bmin.
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Note in particular that bmax > bmin > 0 and that the diﬀerence between bmax and bmin gets
larger and the respective interval is shifted towards larger bonuses as q∗ or ψ increases. Hence,
the larger the potential conﬂict level, the higher are the bonuses that can be implemented.
In fact, for every bonus b there is a conﬂict level ψ such that b is credible.11 While elevated
levels of conﬂict were only welfare detrimental in the pure moral hazard case, i.e. the case
of non-binding truthtelling constraints (see Proposition 1), they relax the upper- and tighten
the lower threshold of credible bonuses.
Implementable Eﬀorts We call a certain eﬀort level p > 0 implementable if b(p) ∈
[bmin, bmax]. Furthermore, we deﬁne the minimum implementable eﬀort pmin and the maxi-
mum implementable eﬀort pmax implicitly by bmin = b(pmin) and bmax = b(pmax).
Optimal Eﬀort Level We denote the maximum of Π(p) = pφ − pγLHq∗ψ − C(p) on
{0} ∪ [pmin, pmax] by p∗. p∗ will be referred to as the optimal eﬀort level (p∗ is the optimal
eﬀort level for the principal given that only eﬀort levels between pmin and pmax are feasible)
and Π∗ = Π(p∗) will be the corresponding proﬁt for the principal.
Proposition 2. Optimal Eﬀort Level
p∗ > 0 if and only if φ > φ > φ with Π(pmin)|φ=φ = 0.
Now suppose that φ > φ.
(i) Binding Lower Truth-Telling Constraint: If 0 < p˜ < pmin, then the principal implements
p∗ = pmin with bonus bmin [Figure 1].
(ii) Binding Upper Truth-Telling Constraint: If p˜ > pmax, then the principal implements
p∗ = pmax with bonus bmax [Figure 2].
(iii) Non-Binding Truth-Telling Constraint: If p˜ ∈ [pmin, pmax], then the principal imple-
ments p∗ = p˜ by paying b(p˜) [Figure 3].
Proof. See Appendix 8.5
According to Proposition 2, there will be no principal-agent relationship (i.e. p∗ = 0)
whenever the returns to the project are below a certain threshold. Note in particular, that
the presence of a truth-telling problem increases the corresponding threshold value compared
to the pure moral hazard case (φ > φ) which already indicates potential welfare losses due
to truth-telling constraints. Finally, observe that in the absence of conﬂict (i.e., q∗Ψ = 0)
it holds that (pmin = 0) such that proﬁts for the principal are zero at pmin for any φ. This
11A comprehensive discussion of the comparative statics of bmax and bmin can be found in Appendix 8.3.
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establishes the familiar result that no positive eﬀort can be implemented in the absence of
conﬂict if performance evaluations are subjective.
[Figures 1-3 here]
As already discussed bmax > bmin > 0. This implies that pmax > pmin > 0 (see Figures
1 to 3). If the value of the project is suﬃciently large to establish a relationship one can
distinguish between three cases (see Proposition 2): i) the case of a binding lower truth-
telling constraint, ii) the case of a binding upper truth-telling constraint (see Figure 1 and 2,
respectively) and iii) the case of a non-binding truth-telling constraint (see Figure 3). The
comparative statics in the latter case have already been analyzed in Proposition 1 (as the
principal simply implements p∗ = p˜). The analysis of cases i) and ii) deserves some more
attention. To this end, the following Lemma captures the comparative statics of pmin and
pmax with respect to the level of conﬂict and the parameters of the information technology.
Lemma 3. Truth-Telling Constraints
(i) dp
min
dΨ > 0 and
dpmax
dΨ > 0. (ii)
dpmax
dg > 0 and
dpmin
dg > 0 for a given Ψ if
dY
dg is suﬃciently
small and dp
max
dg < 0 and
dpmin
dg < 0 for a given Y if Ψ is suﬃciently large. (iii)
dpmax
dρ > 0
and dp
min
dρ < 0 if ψ is suﬃciently large. (iv)
dpmax
dx > 0 and
dpmin
dx > 0 if ψ is suﬃciently large.
Proof. See Appendix 8.6
As the level of conﬂict ψ lifts the minimal credible bonus bmin and the maximal credible
bonus bmax, while leaving the incentive compatible bonus b(p) unaltered, pmin and pmax
increase in ψ (Part (i)). Intuitively, the more conﬂict, the less tempting it is to cheat on the
agent (upper truth-telling constraint) and the more tempting it is to evade conﬂict through
unconditional bonus-payments (lower truth-telling constraint).
In contrast to this, the impact of the information technology on pmin and pmax is more
subtle (see Parts (ii)-(iv)). All parameters of the information technology inﬂuence the mini-
mal, the maximal and the incentive compatible bonus. For instance, a higher quality of the
principal’s signal g reduces the retaliation probability (recall that dq
∗
dg ≤ 0). This, in turn,
lowers bmin and bmax and ceteris paribus lowers pmin and pmax. However, as we have seen in
the previous section, a more accurate signal also reduces the incentive compatible bonus to
implement a certain eﬀort level as the agent faces a lower probability of conﬂict and lower
psychological costs if the principal’s signal is more precise. Ceteris paribus this eﬀect in-
creases pmin and pmax. Now, if the agent’s psychological costs are suﬃciently insensitive to a
change in g (i.e. dYdg is suﬃciently small), the retaliation probability in the case of conﬂicting
signals does not change signiﬁcantly while the probability of conﬂicting signals does such that
the latter eﬀect dominates the former. Likewise, for a given sensitivity to the signal quality
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(dYdg < 0), the former eﬀect dominates the latter if Ψ is suﬃciently large. Similarly to the
impact of g, also ρ and x have a direct and an indirect eﬀect on bmin and bmax. Both param-
eters modify the probability with which the principal could gain from a lie, but also change
the expected psychological costs which have to be compensated by the incentive compatible
bonus. Part (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3 show that, if ψ is suﬃciently large such that the gains
from a lie are suﬃciently pronounced, the former eﬀect dominates the latter.
Welfare Analysis To analyze the comparative statics of the surplus (which is identical
to the principal’s proﬁts in our set-up), observe that the impact of a parameter y on proﬁts
Π(p) can be written as dΠ(p)dy =
∂Π(p)
∂y +
∂Π
∂p
dp
dy . We will refer to the ﬁrst term as the direct
eﬀect and the second as the indirect eﬀect. The direct eﬀect captures the impact of the
parameter on proﬁts for a given eﬀort level. By the envelope theorem, this fully determines
the comparative statics of equilibrium proﬁts in the pure moral hazard case (as ∂Π∂p = 0 for
p = p˜). The indirect eﬀect captures the impact of the parameter on the chosen eﬀort level
and the resulting change in proﬁt.
In the case of non-binding truthtelling constraints, i.e. case iii) in Proposition 2, the
indirect eﬀect vanishes and comparative statics are as depicted in Proposition 1(iii). For cases
i) and ii) in Proposition 2, on the other hand, the indirect eﬀect can no longer be neglected
and may well dominate and reverse the comparative statics of the pure moral hazard case as
demonstrated in the following result.
Proposition 3. Comparative Statics of Welfare
(i) There exists φ˜ such that dΠ
∗
dψ > 0 for all φ > φ˜. (ii) There exists φ, Y and v(p) such that
dΠ∗
dg < 0 and there exists Ψ and φ˜ such that
dΠ∗
dg < 0 for all φ > φ˜. (iii) There exists φ˜ and ψ˜
such that dΠ
∗
dx > 0 if ψ > ψ˜ and φ > φ˜.
Proof. See Appendix 8.7.
Proposition 3 indicates two diﬀerent eﬀects which may reverse the comparative statics of
the pure moral hazard case. First, the upper truthtelling constraint may be binding. This is in
particular the case for large project values φ which induce large marginal beneﬁts and therefore
require optimal eﬀort levels beyond pmax. An increase in ψ or x is welfare detrimental for a
given eﬀort level (i.e. (∂Π∂ψ ) < 0) but also pushes p
max (as indicated in Lemma 3(iv), pmax is
increasing in Ψ and increasing in x if Ψ is suﬃciently large) and thereby relaxes the upper
truth-telling constraint. In contrast, an increase in g is welfare enhancing for a given eﬀort
level (i.e. (∂Π∂g ) > 0) but also reduces p
max (as indicated in Lemma 3(ii), pmax is decreasing
in g if Ψ is suﬃciently large) and thereby tightens the upper truth-telling constraint. As
indicated by Proposition 3(i), (ii), and (iii), the latter (indirect) eﬀects indeed dominate the
former (direct) eﬀects if project values are suﬃciently large. Hence, higher probabilities or
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levels of conﬂict are welfare enhancing while better signals are welfare detrimental in the case
of valuable projects for which the upper truth-telling constraint is tight.
Second, the lower truthtelling constraint may be binding. This is in particular the case for
small project values which are suﬃciently attractive to sign contracts on small positive eﬀort
levels but operate with bonus payments which tempt the principal to evade conﬂict by paying
the bonus unconditional on the signal. In this case, the principal suﬀers from parameter
changes which tighten the lower truthtelling constraint. For instance, the higher the quality
of the principal’s signal g, the larger pmin (if dYdg is suﬃciently small) and the more tight
the lower truthtelling constraint. In contrast, an increase in g enhances the principal’s proﬁt
for a given eﬀort level. According to Proposition 3(ii) the latter (direct) eﬀect may well be
dominated by the former (indirect) eﬀect. As a consequence, a better signal for the principal
may be welfare detrimental in the case of small projects for which the lower truth-telling
constraint is tight.
Note that similar detrimental eﬀects cannot be derived for the correlation of signals ρ,
as a higher correlation directly enhances the principal’s proﬁt and relaxes the lower and the
upper truthtelling constraint as long as ψ is suﬃciently large (see Lemma 3(iii)).
Finally, we compare equilibrium proﬁts with the ﬁrst best solution and discuss the limit
of a perfect signal to the principal, perfectly correlated signals, and no correct independent
judgment of the agent.
Proposition 4. First Best Comparison
(i) Suppose g < 1, ρ < 1, and x > 0. Then, Π(p∗) < Π(pFB). (ii) Let ρ = 1 and/or x = 0.
Then, p∗ = pFB and Π(p∗) = Π(pFB) if and only if φg ≤ ρq∗ψ. (iii) Let g = 1. Then,
p∗ = pFB and Π(p∗) = Π(pFB) if and only if
(1−ρ)x
1−ρx q
∗ψ ≤ φ ≤ (ρ + (1− ρ)x)q∗ψ
Proof. See Appendix 8.8.
Part i) indicates that an imperfect information technology of the principal together with
an imperfect correlation of the principal’s and the agent’s signals and at least some correct
independent judgment of the agent induces a welfare loss.
In Part ii) it can be seen that, if signals are perfectly correlated (ρ = 1) or the agent does
not receive a correct signal, if he has to form an independent judgment (x = 0), a ﬁrst best
will be reached whenever the respective incentive compatible bonus b(pFB) =
v′(pFB)
g =
φ
g is
credible, i.e., b(pFB) ≤ bmax. As the minimal credible bonus bmin is zero for ρ = 1 or x = 0,
only the upper truth-telling constraint matters in this case and a ﬁrst best will be established,
if the project value is not too small compared to the expected costs of retaliation.
This changes if we consider the limit g = 1. Again, a ﬁrst best is reached whenever the
incentive compatible bonus b(pFB) = φ is credible, i.e. b(pFB) is between bmin and bmax.
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However, as bmin = (1−ρ)x1−ρx q
∗ψ does not vanish as long as ρ < 1 and x > 0, the ﬁrst best eﬀort
can be too large (as in Part (ii)) or too small to be implementable (see Part (iii)). Hence, it
requires a ‘ﬁne-tuning’ of φ (relative to expected costs of conﬂict) to guarantee a ﬁrst best
solution in this case.
5 Endogenous Evaluation Process
Until now, we have investigated optimal contract design and welfare implications of an ex-
ogenously given information technology. In reality, however, the principal often does not only
decide upon the contractual arrangements such as bonuses or ﬁxed payments. He may also
decide upon the acquisition of information on the agent’s performance. The principal can, for
example, decide how much time he spends on supervising the agent in the accomplishment
of the project. He could (i) sit next to the agent during the whole project, or (ii) close the
door to his oﬃce and only have a glance at the result. Arguably, the quality of the signal
g is expected to be better under the ﬁrst evaluation procedure.12 Note that we retain the
assumption that ρ and x are exogenous as it seems unrealistic to assume that the agent’s
information acquisition about his own performance is at the discretion of the principal. We
assume that the quality of the signal is costless. This assumption is made i) to simplify the
analysis and ii) to show that even with costless monitoring the principal might not choose a
perfect evaluation procedure.
Implementable Bonuses Recall from the previous sections that a bonus b(p) which makes
the eﬀort choice of p incentive compatible only satisﬁes the upper and lower truthtelling con-
straint of the principal if b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax]. As displayed in Eqn. 3, the incentive compatible
bonus b(p), is monotone decreasing in g with limg→0 b(p) = ∞ and limg→1 = v′(p). Like-
wise, it follows from Eqn. 4 and 5 that bmax and bmin are (weakly) monotone decreasing in
g (because dq
∗
dg ≤ 0) with limg→0 bmin < ∞ and limg→1 bmin = (1−ρ)x1−ρx q∗(g = 1)ψ > 0, and
limg→0 bmax <∞ and limg→1 bmax = (ρ + (1− ρ)x)q∗(g = 1)ψ > 0.
This allows to distinguish the following cases for the implementability of an eﬀort level
p > 0 (see also Figure 4).
Lemma 4. Let p > 0. Then, one of the following cases holds:
(i) Case 1. b(p) > bmax for all g.
Then, p can not be implemented.
12Note that we explicitly avoid terms like control and (dis)trust here (as e.g. used in Falk & Kosfeld (2006)
and Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008)). The choice of the quality of the evaluation procedure has an inﬂuence
on how well the principal can observe an acceptable eﬀort given that the project is a success. Therefore, the
higher the quality of the principal’s evaluation process, the higher the probability that the agent is rewarded
in case of success. A higher quality is, hence, not regarded as negative by the agent.
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(ii) Case 2. b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 but b(p) > bmax for g = 1.
Then, p > 0 is implemented with the maximal g for which b(p) = bmax.
(iii) Case 3. b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 but b(p) < bmin for g = 1.
Then, p > 0 is implemented with the maximal g for which b(p) = bmin.
(iv) Case 4. b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax] for g = 1.
Then, p > 0 is implemented with b(p) = v′(p) (at g = 1).
Proof. Obvious.
[Figures 4 and 5 here]
Case 1 simply captures a conﬁguration of the model where eﬀort p cannot be implemented
with any signal quality g because incentive compatible bonuses are too large to be credible.
A special case of this situation is the absence of psychological payoﬀs (Y = 0) or the lack of
retaliation opportunities (Ψ = 0). Case 4 depicts the situation that the incentive compatible
bonus is credible for signal quality g = 1. As eﬀort costs C(p) are decreasing in g (a better
signal reduces the probability of conﬂict and expected psychological costs), the principal will
always implement p with the largest possible signal quality.13
Figure 4 shows Case 2 in which b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 but not at g = 1. The optimal
bonus and signal quality is denoted bmax and g. Figure 5, on the other hand, shows Case 3
in which b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 but b(p) < bmin for g = 1. In this case the optimal bonus
and signal quality is respectively denoted by bmin and g.
The following example shows that all these cases can occur in our model.
Example 1. Let c(q) = 11−q − q− 1, Y = (2− 1.9g), ρ = 1/2, x = 1/2, φ = 1/2, and suppose
that the principal wants to implement pFB, i.e., v′(p) = φ.
• Let ψ = 1. Then, b(p) > bmax for all g (Case 1).
• Let ψ = 10. Then, b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 and b(p) > bmax for g = 1 (Case 2).
• Let ψ = 100. Then, b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 and b(p) < bmin for g = 1 (Case 3).
• Let ψ = 20. Then, b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax] for g = 1 (Case 4).
As suggested by the example, Case 1 (Case 3 ) will be the relevant description of im-
plementability if the level of conﬂict ψ is suﬃciently small (large) as the following result
indicates.
13Recall that signal quality was assumed to be costless. Whenever costs of information acquisition are
increasing in g there is an obvious tradeoﬀ between decreasing eﬀort costs C(p) and increasing costs of quality.
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Lemma 5. Suppose p > 0. Then, (i) there exists Ψ > 0 such that Case 1 holds whenever
ψ < Ψ and (iii) there exists Ψ > 0 such that Case 3 holds whenever ψ > Ψ and Y (g = 1) 	= 0.
Proof. The results follow directly from db(p)dψ = 0, limg→0 b(p) = ∞, and the fact that bmin
and bmax are linear functions in Ψ with strictly positive slope (db
min
dψ =
(1−ρ)x
1−ρx q
∗ > 0 and
dbmax
dψ = (ρ+ (1− ρ)x)q∗ > 0) for g ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, bmin and bmax are strictly positive for
g ∈ (0, 1) and are strictly positive for g = 1 whenever Y (g = 1) > 0.
Lemma 5 implies that the principal will not choose g = 1 to implement a certain eﬀort
level whenever ψ is too small or too large. If the conﬂict level is too low, the incentive com-
patible bonus may be too large to be credible. Perhaps a little bit more surprisingly, conﬂict
levels can also be too large to implement a certain eﬀort level with a perfect information
technology even if the quality of the signal is costless. Intuitively, the principal has to main-
tain signal imperfections because incentive compatible bonuses decrease in signal quality (the
more precise the signal, the smaller the necessary bonus for the implementation of a certain
eﬀort level) and these bonuses can be too small to be credible (the principal prefers to always
pay the bonus because of conﬂict evasion).
Welfare Implications The previous paragraph demonstrated that additional discretion
about the quality of her signal clearly increases the set of implementable eﬀorts at the prin-
cipal’s disposal. However, certain eﬀort levels still do not have to be implementable at any
g (Case 1), or are not implementable at g = 1 (Cases 2 and 3). This holds in particular for
pFB which leads to the following welfare implications.
Proposition 5. Suppose Case 1, 2 or 3 describes implementability of pFB.14 Then, Π(p∗) <
ΠFB.
Proof. Consider Case 1. As pFB is not implementable, Π(p∗) < ΠFB due to the unique
optimality of pFB.
Consider Case 2 and 3. Then pFB can not be implemented with g = 1. Hence, for marginal
costs of eﬀort implementation it follows that C ′(pFB) > v′(pFB) which implies p˜ < pFB as
C(p) is convex and results in Π∗ < ΠFB .
According to Proposition 5, the ﬁrst best will not necessarily be implemented by the
principal even if he can choose any signal quality at zero costs. As indicated by Lemma 5
this will be in particular the case if conﬂict level ψ is below a certain threshold such that
the corresponding incentive compatible bonus is too large to be credible or above a certain
threshold such that ﬁrst best bonuses at g = 1 are too small to be credible. Hence, high
14Example 1 and Lemma 5 show that this holds true for an appropriate choice of ψ.
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levels of conﬂict are suggested to be responsible for the endogenous choice of imperfect infor-
mation technologies or the persistence of considerably subjective judgments in performance
evaluation.
6 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of our model revealed that self-esteem and the individual’s eagerness to pro-
tect it may facilitate principal-agent relationships even if performance signals are subjective
and no third-party can enforce truth-telling. In particular, we analyzed the impact of the
conﬂict level, the psychological sensitivity to ego-threats, and the quality of the information
technology on optimal eﬀort levels and social welfare.
Conﬂict Level Conﬂict as modelled in this paper unambiguously reduces optimal eﬀort lev-
els and social welfare in the absence of truth-telling constraints. In the presence of truthtelling
constraints, however, we demonstrate that some conﬂict potential is needed to establish a
positive eﬀort by the agent and that enhanced conﬂict levels have a positive eﬀect on social
welfare in the case of valuable projects which require substantial bonus payments to the agent.
Hence, a well-functioning (internal or external) processing of appeals against managerial de-
cision making is not only providing a more peaceful workforce, it may also implement the
conﬂict level needed to make bonus payments credible and thereby raise ﬁrm proﬁts.
Sensitivity to Ego-Threats Higher levels of conﬂict unambiguously raise the maximum
credible bonus and thereby relax the upper truthtelling constraint in a potentially welfare en-
hancing way. In contrast, the impact of psychological sensitivity to ego threats is more subtle.
First of all, some sensitivity is needed to establish the prospect of conﬂict for the principal
and thereby ensure truthtelling. The more aggressive the agent reacts to ego-threats, the
higher the anticipated level of conﬂict and the less restrictive the upper truthtelling con-
straint. Hence, a more aggressive agent will induce a welfare improvement in case of valuable
projects with associated high bonus payments as discussed above. However, the higher the
sensitivity of the agent, the larger the required compensation for anticipated psychological
costs. This ceteris paribus enhances necessary bonus payments for a given eﬀort level and
thereby reduces the principal’s proﬁt and social welfare. The ideal agent from the point of
view of a principal who wishes to conduct a very valuable project is therefore someone who
reacts very aggressively to ego-threats (i.e., who has low costs of retaliation) but does not
suﬀer to much from an ego-threat and the corresponding retaliation (e.g., because q∗ is large).
This reinforces our above-made appraisal of appeal systems and suggests to ensure low costs
of conﬂict creation for the employee (e.g., low costs of law suits etc.). Note, however, that
these recommendations only hold for very valuable projects which make the upper truthtelling
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constraint binding. For non-binding truthtelling constraints, psychological sensitivity and the
corresponding conﬂict remains detrimental to the principal’s proﬁts and welfare.
Information Technology Moreover, we analyzed the impact of the information technology
on optimal eﬀorts and welfare. First of all, the principal is advised to use a signal technology
which displays a perfectly correlated signal to her and the agent. With perfectly correlated
signals the probability of conﬂicting signals is zero such that the agent does not expect
any psychological costs. Moreover, the lower (upper) truthtelling constraint is decreasing
(increasing) in the signal correlation such that the interval of credible bonuses is maximized
for a given conﬂict level. Whenever the ﬁrst best bonus is credible, perfectly correlated signals
will allow the agent to implement a ﬁrst best. This lends support to the practice of using
information for performance evaluation which is not necessarily highly correlated with actual
performance but ensures a high correlation with the agent’s self-assessment. Similarly, the
probability of conﬂict will be zero if the agent does not observe good performance independent
of the principal. Hence, a ﬁrst best can also be achieved with agents who lack an informative
independent judgement (i.e., x = 0). However, both truthtelling constraints are decreasing
in x, such that implementability of the ﬁrst best is less straightforward for x = 0 than for
perfectly correlated signals.
The impact of the quality of the principal’s signal has shown to be twofold. On the
one hand, a better signal reduces necessary bonus payments (due to higher expected returns
and lower psychological costs for the agent), on the other hand, a better signal reduces the
psychological sensitivity and thereby yields a decrease in the level of conﬂict. If the agent’s
perception of an ego-threat is suﬃciently sensitive to the signal quality of the principal or
conﬂict levels are suﬃciently large, a better signal will tighten the upper truthtelling constraint
and therefore yield a welfare loss in the case of very valuable projects. If, however, the
impact of the signal quality on psychological costs is rather weak, a better signal will mainly
reduce agency costs and yield a welfare improvement – unless the lower truthtelling constraint
binds, which may be the case for less valuable projects. Hence, the principal can only savely
expect higher proﬁts from employing a better information technology if project values are
not too small or too large. As a consequence he will not always choose a perfect information
technology even if this is costless. The optimal choice of an information technology rather
deals with a tradeoﬀ between agency costs (which are decreasing in the signal quality) and
truthtelling constraints (which may well be tightened by a better information technology).
Hence, imperfect information technologies as observed in reality may not only be optimal due
to cost considerations but also due to the strategic aspects as discussed in this paper.
Discussion We have decided to address the impact of ego-threats on principal-agent rela-
tionships in a rather simple model. The information technology is binary and never misiden-
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tiﬁes a bad outcome, agents are risk-neutral and not protected by limited liability, psycho-
logical costs are represented by an ad-hoc function of signal conﬁgurations, and team-eﬀects
are ignored. We have opted for these simpliﬁcations in order to provide a framework which
allows for an easy identiﬁcation of the relevant eﬀects as discussed in the previous paragraphs.
However, several extensions of our basic model may deserve some attention.
First of all, a certain robustness of our results can be expected for more general informa-
tion technologies. The general impact of conﬂict and psychological sensitivity in the absence
and presence of binding truthtelling constraints does not depend on the exact parametriza-
tion of the information technology but rather on the assumption that a tension between the
principal’s and the agent’s signal creates conﬂict which induces truthtelling by the principal.
Second, we have chosen to model the agent as risk-neutral and with unlimited liability.
While this obviously promoted expositional ease, it focuses on the special case of a principal-
agent relationship which never leaves a rent to the agent. The presence of these rents clearly
aﬀects a welfare analysis. While diﬀerent conﬂict levels only inﬂuence the principal’s proﬁt
and truthtelling constraints (as analyzed in this paper), a change in the agent’s sensitivity
to ego-threats or the quality of the principal’s signal does no longer leave the agent’s proﬁts
unchanged. A proper welfare analysis under these circumstances, however, would ask for a
comparison of (anticipated) psychological costs and material wage beneﬁts. In contrast to
our results which are not sensitive to assumptions in this respect (as long as the principal
somehow manages to set the ﬁx payment in such a way that the agent does not receive any
rents from the relationship), a welfare analysis of rents and proﬁts is. Meaningful results in
this respect would require an empirical assessment of the anticipation of ego-threats and their
present value which is not oﬀered by the existing literature in social psychology and beyond
the scope of the present paper.
Third, we opted for a simple and functional representation of self-esteem and ego-threats.
In particular, we assumed that an agent retaliates for a certain signal conﬁguration even
though he anticipates that the principal truthfully reveals her private signal. A coherent
justiﬁcation of this assumption would either have to rely on a distinction between a cold-blood
participation and eﬀort selection decision versus emotional retaliation behavior or requires a
modelling of a larger signal space (as e.g., in [McLeod (2003)]) where the principal has an
incentive to pool several diﬀerent signals into one and the same bonus payment. Then,
receiving a bonus payment which is also assigned to agents with lower performance again
creates the tension analyzed in this paper. As a consequence, the wage compression eﬀects as
identiﬁed in [McLeod(2003)] would be mitigated by the principal’s incentive to evade conﬂict.
To go beyond the current model of signal dependent utility and to aim for a modelling of ego-
threats with belief-dependent utility in a psychological game (comparable to recent models
of reciprocity such as [Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2003) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006)]
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or procedural fairness [Sebald (2007)]) is certainly regarded as a valuable question for future
theoretical and empirical research.
Finally, it is known since long [see Malcomson (1984)] that the problem of non-enforceable
contracts in the presence of subjective performance measures is easily solved if the principal
has to deal with a team of agents and can pay them according to a ranking with pre-committed
payments for each rank. If agents do not suﬀer from psychological costs in these kind of
tournaments, a ﬁrst best can be achieved and performance pay as characterized in this paper
is never superior. However, it is an empirical question whether tournaments actually lead to
lower psychological costs. If self-esteem is threatened ﬁercely by the explicit announcement
that someone-else is better, the principal may well face more conﬂict ex-post. This can lead
to an inferiority of such a scheme and promote performance pay as discussed in our paper,
where self-esteem is not threatened by a relative performance measure but by an absolute
evaluation.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Information Technology
The conditional probabilities γk,l for signal conﬁguration (sP = k,sA = l) read
γHH = g (ρ + (1− ρ) x) and γHL = g(1 − ρ)(1− x),
γLL = (1− g) (ρ + (1− ρ) (1− x)) and γLH = (1− g) (1− ρ)x.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To save on notation, we denote Y (tP = l, sA = k, g)(1 − q∗) − c(q∗) ≡ Ykl throughout this
proof.
Part(i). For a given contract Γ and signals sP and sA, the principal and the agent decide
upon their report. Let σP : SP → Δ(SP ) and σA : SA → Δ(SA) be the principal’s and agent’s
reporting strategies (i.e., mappings from the set of signals SP and SA to the set of probability
distributions over SP and SA, respectively). Suppose that (σ∗P , σ
∗
A) is the pair of optimal
reporting strategies for contract Γ. Then, the revelation principle implies that there exists a
contract Γˆ which implements the same eﬀort at the same costs and induces truthful reports
by principal and agent. We will, henceforth, restrict our analysis to this type of (revelation)
contracts.
Part (ii). Suppose that Γ = {wkl} is a revelation contract, i.e., the principal and the
agent tell the truth under contract Γ. As Γ implements p > 0, the incentive compatibility
constraint
Σk∈SP ,l∈SA(wkl − Ykl)
dPr{sP = k, sA = l}
dp
= v′(p)
is satisﬁed. Consider a contract Γˆ which ﬁxes payments of wˆk =
∑
l∈SA wklPr{sP = k, sA = l}
if the principal receives signal sP = k, i.e., payments are independent of sA. These payments
also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (see above).15 Moreover, the agent weakly
beneﬁts from telling the truth. Finally, the principal’s truth-telling constraint is also satisﬁed
15Individual rationality is trivially fulﬁlled as expected payments for the agent are the same under Γ and Γˆ
and Γ is individually rational by assumption.
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under Γˆ. To see this observe that the principal reports k given that he has received k under
contract Γ if
Pr{sA = H|sP = k}(woH − wkH) + Pr{sA = L|sP = k}(woL − wkL) (6)
≥ Pr{sA = H|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kH − (q∗ψ)oH) + Pr{sA = L|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kL − (q∗ψ)oL)
for all o ∈ SP (where (q∗ψ)tA,tP denotes the anticipated conﬂict costs for a reported conﬁgura-
tion (tA, tP )). This set of inequalities holds because Γ implements truth-telling by assumption.
Γˆ implements truth-telling if
wˆo − wˆk ≥ Pr{sA = H|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kH − (q∗ψ)oH) + Pr{sA = L|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kL − (q∗ψ)oL).
holds for all o, k ∈ SP . Inserting wˆk and wˆo yields
Pr{sA = H|sP = k}(woH − ckH) + Pr{sA = L|sP = k}(woL − wkL)
≥ Pr{sA = H|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kH − (q∗ψ)oH ) + Pr{sA = L|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kL − (q∗ψ)oL).
which coincides with Eqs. 6 and therefore shows that for Γˆ the principal’s truthtelling con-
straint is satisﬁed as well. Hence, any revelation contract Γ can be substituted by a revelation
contract Γˆ with wkl independent of l which also implements p > 0 and leaves the principal
weakly better oﬀ.
Part (iii). Suppose by contradiction that Γ implements p > 0 with wH = g and wL = g+
with  ≥ 0. Then, the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent can be written as
 =
v′(p) + γLHYLH
(γLH + γLL − 1) .
Observe that the numerator of the rhs is strictly positive and the denominator is strictly
negative. Hence, the rhs is strictly negative and the incentive compatibility constraint is not
satisﬁed for any  ≥ 0. A contradiction.
8.3 Comparative Statics of Bonuses
b(p) =
v′(p) + γLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))
γHH + γHL
=
1
g
(v′(p) + (1− g)(1 − ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗)))
and dYdg ≤ 0 imply the following results.
Lemma 6. Comparative Statics of b(p)
(i) Suppose p > 0. Then, b(p) > 0. (ii) limp→0 b(p) > 0. (iii)
db(p)
dp > 0. (iv)
db(p)
dg < 0. (v)
db(p)
dρ < 0. (vi)
db(p)
dx > 0.
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bmax =
γHH
(γHH + γHL)
q∗ψ = (ρ + (1− ρ)x)q∗ψ
bmin =
γLH
(γLH + γLL)
q∗ψ =
(1− ρ)x
(1− ρx)q
∗ψ
together with dYdg ≤ 0 imply the following results.
Lemma 7. Comparative Statics of bmax and bmin
(i) bmin > 0. (ii) bmax > bmin. (iii) Δb ≡ bmax − bmin is monotone increasing in q∗ and ψ.
(iv) bmin is monotone increasing in q∗, ψ, and x and monotone decreasing in ρ and g. (v)
bmax is monotone increasing in q∗, ψ, ρ and x and monotone decreasing in g.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from the positive correlation of signals, i.e., ρ > 0 or γHHγLL >
γHLγLH .
(iii) Follows from Δb = γHHγLL−γHLγLH(γHH+γHL)+(γLH+γLL)q
∗ψ.
(iv) and (v) follow directly from Eqs 4 and 5.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Part(i). Consider
Π(p) = pφ− pγLHq∗ψ −C(p)
with C(p) = v(p) + pγLH((1 − q∗)Y + c(q∗)). Observe that Π = ap − v(p) with a = φ −
γLH(q∗Ψ+ ((1− q∗)Y + c(q∗))). Recall that v(0) = 0, v′(0) = 0, and v′′(p) > 0. Then, p˜ > 0
if and only if a > 0.
Part (ii). We use the ﬁrst order condition
dΠ
dp
= φ− γLHq∗ψ − v′(p)− γLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗)) = 0. (7)
as an implicit function of p˜. With we get
dp˜
dφ
= − 1−v′′(p˜) > 0,
dp˜
dψ
= −−γLHq
∗
−v′′(p˜) < 0,
dp˜
dγLH
= −−q
∗ψ − (Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))
−v′′(p˜) < 0,
dp˜
dY
= −−γLHψ
dq∗
dY − γLH(1− q∗)
−v′′(p˜) < 0.
which implies Part (ii) (recall that dγLHdg < 0,
dγLH
dρ < 0,
dγLH
dx > 0, and
dY
dg < 0).
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Part (iii). Follows directly from
∂Π(p)
∂φ
= p > 0,
∂Π(p)
∂Ψ
= −pγLHq∗ < 0,
∂Π(p)
∂g
= −pdγLH
dg
(q∗Ψ + (Y (1− q∗)− c(q∗)))− pγLH dq
∗
dg
Ψ− pγLH(1− q∗)dY
dg
> 0,
∂Π(p)
∂ρ
= −pdγLH
dρ
(q∗Ψ + (Y (1− q∗)− c(q∗))) > 0,
∂Π(p)
∂x
= −pdγLH
dx
(q∗Ψ + (Y (1− q∗)− c(q∗))) < 0
for any p > 0 and the envelope theorem dΠ˜dy =
∂Π
∂y |p=p˜ for a parameter y.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 2
′′ ⇐′′ Suppose φ > φ. As ∂Π∂φ > 0, Π(pmin)|φ > 0 = Π(p = 0) and therefore p∗ > 0. By
Proposition 1, this implies that φ ≤ φ.
′′ ⇒′′ Suppose p∗ > 0. Then, φ > φ (see Proposition 1). Hence, Π(p) is continuous in
p ≥ 0 and concave with a unique maximum at p˜ > 0. Now suppose that φ < φ such that
Π(pmin)|φ < 0. Then, p˜ < pmin and Π(p) < 0 for all p ∈ [pmin, pmax]. A contradiction.
To see that φ 	= φ, recall from Lemma 7 that bmin > 0 which implies pmin > 0. Now
suppose that φ = φ = φ. Then, Π(pmin) = 0 by deﬁnition of Φ. Then, continuity and
concavity of Π(p) imply 0 < p˜ < pmin where the ﬁrst inequality contradicts Proposition 1(i).
Items (i) to (iii) are a direct implication of the fact that Π(p) is continuous in p ≥ 0
and concave with a unique maximum at p˜ > 0 whenever φ > φ, and the observation that
pmax > pmin > 0.
8.6 Proof of Lemma 3
pmin is implicitly given by
bmin =
(1− ρ)x
1− ρx q
∗ψ =
1
g
(v′(pmin) + (1− g)(1 − ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) = b(pmin)
and pmax is implicitly given by
bmax = (ρ + (1− ρ)x)q∗ψ = 1
g
(v′(pmax) + (1− g)(1 − ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) = b(pmax).
We use these equations to compute the comparative statics of pmin and pmax. To be speciﬁc,
let Fmin = bmin − b(p) and Fmax = bmax − b(p). Then, for a parameter y, dpmin/maxdy =
−∂Fmin/max/∂y
∂Fmin/max/∂p
. Note that ∂F
min/max
∂p = −v
′′(p)
g < 0.
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Part (i). Follows from ∂b
min−b(p)
∂ψ =
(1−ρ)x
1−ρx q
∗ > 0 and ∂b
max−b(p)
∂ψ = (ρ + (1− ρ)x)q∗ > 0.
Part (ii). Observe that ∂b
min−b(p)
∂g =
(1−ρ)x
1−ρx
dq∗
dg ψ +
b(p)
g +
1
g ((1− ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗)))−
(1 − g)(1 − ρ)(1 − q∗)xdYdg and ∂b
max−b(p)
∂g = (ρ + (1 − ρ)x)dq
∗
dg ψ +
b(p)
g +
1
g ((1 − ρ)x(Y (1 −
q∗) + c(q∗))) − (1− g)(1 − ρ)(1 − q∗)xdYdg . Both expressions are positive whenever dq
∗
dg ≤ 0 is
suﬃciently small (e.g., if dYdg = 0). For a given
dY
dg < 0, however, there is always a conﬂict
level Ψ such that both expressions are negative.
Part (iii). ∂b
min−b(p)
∂ρ =
−x(1−x)
(1−ρx)2 q
∗ψ + 1g ((1 − g)x(Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗))) is negative if ψ is
suﬃciently large (for a given 0 < x < 1) and positive if x = 1. Moreover, ∂b
max−b(p)
∂ρ =
(1− x)q∗ψ + 1g ((1− g)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) > 0.
Part (iv). ∂b
min−b(p)
∂x =
1−ρ
(1−ρx)2 q
∗ψ − 1g ((1 − g)(1 − ρ)(Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗))) is positive if ψ
is suﬃciently large or g = 1. ∂b
max−b(p)
∂x = (1 − ρ)q∗ψ − 1g ((1 − g)(1 − ρ)(Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗)))
is positive if ψ is suﬃciently large or g = 1.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 3
The impact of a parameter y on equilibrium proﬁts Π(p∗) can be denoted by dΠ(p
∗)
dy =
∂Π(p∗)
∂y +
∂Π(p∗)
∂p
dp∗
dy . For
∂Π(p)
∂y see the proof of Proposition 1(iii).
∂Π(p)
∂p = Φ−γLHq∗ψ−v′(p)−γLH(Y (1−
q∗) + c(q∗)). Note that for a ﬁxed p, ∂Π(p)∂p is a linear increasing function of φ and for a ﬁxed
φ it is a decreasing function of p with slope −v′′(p).
Part (i). Recall from Lemma 3(i) that dp
max
dψ > 0. Fix any p
max ∈ (0, 1). Then, there
exists a project value φ′ such that ∂Π(p)∂p |p=pmax > 0 and p∗ = pmax for all φ > φ′. In particular,
∂Π(p)
∂p |p=p∗ dp
∗
dψ > 0. As
dpmax
dψ and
∂Π(p)
∂ψ are independent of φ and
∂Π(p)
∂p is a linear increasing
function of φ, there exists a φ′′ such that dΠ(p
∗)
dψ > 0 for all φ > φ˜ ≡ max (φ′, φ′′).
Part (ii). Fix any pmin ∈ (0, 1) and a positive real number z. Then, there exists an
eﬀort cost function v(p) such that v
′(pmin)
v′′(pmin) > z and there exists a project value φ such that
0 < p˜ < pmin and Π(pmin) > 0 (and therefore p∗ = pmin). Now suppose that dYdg = 0. Then,
by Lemma 3(ii), dp
min
dg > 0 and
∂Π(p)
∂g = −pdγLHdg (q∗Ψ+(Y (1− q∗)+ c(q∗))) > 0 (see the proof
of Proposition 1). Now observe that ∂Π(p)∂g is independent of v(p) and its derivatives while
∂Π
∂p
∂pmin
∂g is increasing in
v′(p)
v′′(p) . Hence,
dΠ(p)
dg < 0 if z is suﬃciently large.
For the second part recall from Lemma 3(i) that dp
max
dg < 0 if Ψ is suﬃciently large. Fix any
pmax ∈ (0, 1). Then, there exists a project value φ′ such that ∂Π(p)∂p |p=pmax > 0 and p∗ = pmax
for all φ > φ′. In particular, ∂Π(p)∂p |p=p∗ dp
∗
dg < 0. As
dpmax
dg and
∂Π(p)
∂g are independent of φ
and ∂Π(p)∂p is a linear increasing function of φ, there exists a φ
′′ such that dΠ(p
∗)
dg < 0 for all
φ > φ˜ ≡ max (φ′, φ′′).
Part (iii). Recall from Lemma 3(iv) that there exists a ψ˜ such that dp
max
dx > 0 for all
ψ > ψ˜. Fix any pmax ∈ (0, 1) with such a ψ. Then, there exists a project value φ′ such that
∂Π(p)
∂p |p=pmax > 0 and p∗ = pmax for all φ > φ′. In particular, ∂Π(p)∂p |p=p∗ dp
∗
dx > 0. As
dpmax
dx
and ∂Π(p)∂x are independent of φ and
∂Π(p)
∂p is a linear increasing function of φ, there exists a
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φ′′ such that dΠ(p
∗)
dx > 0 for all φ > φ˜ ≡ max (φ′, φ′′).
8.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Part (i). Follows from C(p) > v(p) for every p > 0.
Part (ii) and (iii). g = 1, ρ = 1, or x = 0 implies that γLH = 0 and therefore Π(p) = pφ−v(p)
such that p˜ = pFB. However, b(pFB) has to be in the interval [bmin, bmax] which results in
the condition displayed in the proposition (recall that for x = 0 or ρ = 1, bmin = 0).
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